Budget-Aware Adaptive Adversarial Patches for Black-Box Object Detection

Jun 16, 2026· Pedram MohajerAnsari, Amir Salarpour, David FernandezDavid Fernandez , Mert D. Pesé

Key Contributions & Takeaways

An adversarial patch is a small pattern that can make a detector lose track of what it sees. Creating one without access to the model’s internals requires repeated queries, and simply making the patch larger can hide how expensive or conspicuous an attack is. PatchBandit adapts placement, texture, and size together, measuring success alongside those costs.

  • One loop controls where, what, and how large. Contextual Thompson sampling chooses a location, Natural Evolution Strategies updates the pixels using detector scores, and the patch grows only when progress stalls. No model weights or gradients are required.
  • Success is measured on the plain image. The original top-class confidence must fall by at least 0.25 and end at 0.10 or below. The baseline achieves 77.5% strict suppression on YOLOv5, 89.7% on Faster R-CNN, and 59.1% on YOLOS; robustness across transformed views is assessed separately.
  • Faster growth can save queries without enlarging the typical patch. On YOLOv5, GP5 reduces median queries from 1,079 to 529, with nearly unchanged success (77.5% → 77.7%) and the same 8.32% median image area. Other detectors show different trade-offs.
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01 · The problem

Every query costs. Every pixel shows.

A patch can fool an object detector, but its practical cost depends on how many times the attacker queries the model and how much of the image the patch covers.

02 · The approach

Adapt three decisions together

PatchBandit searches for a useful location, improves the pattern, and increases its size only after progress stalls, all through a score-based black-box interface.

03 · The finding

Detector architecture changes the trade-off

The baseline suppresses the original top class in 77.5–89.7% of tested cases on the two CNN detectors and 59.1% on the transformer detector.

Same object. Different prediction.

A localized pattern changes the detector’s output while the object remains in view.

Physical example

160 px patch
Clean view
Top predictionBicycle · 0.95
With patch
Top predictionMotorbike · 0.36

Digital example

60 px patch
Clean view
Top predictionBoat · 0.91
With patch
Top predictionCat · 0.92
Original schematic drawings of the examples reported in Figure 1. Labels, confidence scores, and nominal patch sizes are from the paper; scene geometry, boxes, and patch patterns are illustrative and not to scale. These top-label changes do not by themselves establish strict suppression.

Inside PatchBandit

A detector returns boxes, classes, and confidence scores. Its weights and gradients stay hidden.

  1. Choose where

    A contextual Thompson-sampling policy explores candidate grid cells. Features describe proximity to annotated objects, texture variation, and image borders.

  2. Improve the pattern

    Natural Evolution Strategies tests pixel perturbations and uses the resulting confidence changes to update the patch, without backpropagating through the detector.

  3. Grow only if stalled

    If the reward stops improving for a set number of iterations, the patch moves to the next size and the placement grid is rebuilt. Otherwise, its footprint stays small.

Repeat with feedback: update the placement policy from observed rewards, then search again. Stop at strict success or the query cap.
Conceptual flow of the method in Section 3 and Algorithm 1. The digital attack optimizes each image separately; it does not assume access to detector parameters.

What counts as success?

The target is the highest-confidence class in the clean image. On the patched, untransformed image, both conditions must hold:

Confidence drop ≥ 0.25 and Remaining confidence ≤ 0.10

Confidence is the maximum score for that class across detected boxes, or zero if the class is absent. Suppressing that class does not mean every object disappears. Expectation over Transformation (EOT) tests transformed views separately; an EOT average is not a replacement for this plain-image test.

Success, footprint, and query cost

Three detector families expose different vulnerabilities. These baseline results use the paper’s strict plain-image criterion.

YOLOv5

77.5%One-stage CNN · strict success

Faster R-CNN

89.7%Two-stage CNN · strict success

YOLOS

59.1%ViT transformer · strict success
Baseline PatchBandit (ctx-strict), Table 2
DetectorStrict successMedian patch areaMedian queries
YOLOv577.5%8.32%1,079
Faster R-CNN89.7%0.92%177
YOLOS59.1%8.32%290

Area is a percentage of the image. These numbers are reproduced from Table 2; the fixed-size ablation in Table 3 reports different query counts for the CNN detectors.

On YOLOv5, earlier growth roughly halves queries

GP5 shortens the patience before increasing patch size. It retains almost the same success rate and median footprint as the baseline.

Baseline1,079 queries
GP5 · faster growth529 queries
YOLOv5, Table 2: median queries fall by approximately 51%; strict success changes from 77.5% to 77.7%, with median patch area unchanged at 8.32%.

The trade-off changes on YOLOS: GP5 cuts median queries from 290 to 47.5 and raises success from 59.1% to 60.8%, but increases median area from 8.32% to 14.79%.

Explore the trade-off

Higher success, smaller patch, fewer queries: no single configuration wins every measure.

YOLOv5

↑ More success   ·   ← Less image area
YOLOv5: strict success versus median patch areaBaseline: 77.5 percent success, 8.32 percent area, 1079 median queries. GP5: 77.7 percent success, 8.32 percent area, 529 median queries. Fixed 160 pixels: 71.1 percent success, 14.8 percent area, 133 median queries.Strict success (%)02550751000%4%8%12%16%Median patch area (% of image)Baseline1,079 median queriesGP5529 median queriesFixed 160 px133 median queries

Baseline

Success
77.5%
Image area
8.32%
Queries
1,079

GP5

Success
77.7%
Image area
8.32%
Queries
529

Fixed 160 px

Success
71.1%
Image area
14.80%
Queries
133

Baseline and GP5 nearly overlap: the same 8.32% footprint and almost identical success, but GP5 uses about half the median queries. Fixed 160 px uses fewer queries with a larger footprint and lower success.

Recreated from Table 2. Each marker represents a configuration; shapes and colors identify it, and labels report median queries. The small image tiles show median patch area to scale, with illustrative placement and texture. All detector views use the same axes.

From digital optimization to a printed patch

A small print–capture pilot tests a bottle patch under changes in distance, viewpoint, and object instance.

YOLOv5 detected the bottle with confidence above 0.90 in clean shots. With the printed patch, the reported conditions produced different kinds of errors:

01 · Frontal

Original bottle

40 cm · 0°
Top predictionChair · 0.59Misclassified
02 · Tilted

Original bottle

50 cm · 10°
Top predictionTV monitor · 0.35Misclassified
03 · Transfer

New bottle #1

54 cm · 0°
Top predictionBottle · 0.41Wrong box / low confidence
04 · Transfer

New bottle #2

54 cm · 0°
Top predictionBottle · 0.81Wrong box

Original schematic illustrations of the four conditions in Table 4. Predictions, scores, distances, and viewing angles are reported measurements; bottle shapes, patch textures, and box positions are illustrative.

These are individual pilot observations, not a physical success-rate benchmark. A wrong bounding box or class change is distinct from satisfying the digital strict-suppression test.

What the evidence supports—and its limits

Score access and scene context

The attack needs detector confidence scores. Placement features also use ground-truth boxes; a label-only API or an unannotated scene does not provide the same information.

Measured suppression, not universal failure

The digital metric targets the original top class. It does not establish that all detections vanish, or that one universal patch achieves the same rates across arbitrary scenes.

Preliminary physical transfer

The bottle pilot supports transfer in the tested conditions. Wider claims about lighting, long distances, and deployment environments need broader physical evaluation.

The practical lesson: evaluate adversarial patches against a joint budget of queries and visible area, and keep plain-image suppression separate from robustness across transformations.

Source: the paper, arXiv:2606.18318v1, Sections 3–4 and Tables 2–4. The DOI and BibTeX refer to the arXiv version; the venue is listed as accepted to ICIP 2026.

Abstract

“PatchBandit learns where to place a patch, how to change its pixels, and when to enlarge it, using only detector outputs. Its success depends on both the query budget and the space the patch occupies.”

Adversarial patches pose a practical threat to modern object detectors. Prior work shows vulnerability, but three gaps limit actionable insight: (i) few score-based black-box attacks jointly optimize patch location, texture, and size under tight query budgets; (ii) success is rarely tied to the patch’s visual footprint; and (iii) evaluations often conflate EOT robustness with plain-view suppression. We present PatchBandit, a query-efficient, budget-adaptive black-box attack that couples a lightweight Contextual Thompson-Sampling placer with NES-style pixel updates, growing the patch only when progress stalls. Reporting is anchored by a strict plain-image suppression test; EOT is audited but never used as a substitute for success, and optional appearance/printability weights expose strength–visibility trade-offs. Across YOLOv5, Faster R-CNN, and YOLOS, PatchBandit achieves strong suppression on CNN-based detectors and substantial suppression on the transformer-based detector, using compact patches and exposing clear query–footprint trade-offs relative to fixed-size and heuristic baselines. A print–capture pilot further shows transfer across unseen physical objects and viewpoints.
Venue 2026 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP) — Accepted
David Fernandez
Authors
PhD Candidate in Computer Science

David Fernandez is a PhD candidate in Computer Science at Clemson University and an AI Researcher at BMW Group. His research focuses on safe, efficient, and explainable AI, spanning large language models, vision-language models, agentic systems, and adversarial robustness. His 10 papers include five first-authored studies on component-level explainability, zero-shot reasoning, and adversarial scenario analysis.

At BMW Group, he develops enterprise AI agents, automated prompt optimization, and defenses against multi-turn adversarial attacks. His work also includes edge AI for industrial agentic systems.

Through Clemson’s Virtual Prototyping of Ground Systems (VIPR-GS) program, he develops explainable reasoning and multimodal evaluation systems for the U.S. Army’s Next Generation Combat Vehicle program.